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cial advances of the science itself, since 1883, are treated in greater or less degree. Beginning with a review (1883) of A. Réville's *Les religions des peuples non civilisés*, the author initiates a series of summaries and discussions that deal with the contributions and views of (1886) Spencer's *Ecclesiastical Institutions*; (1888) Andrew Lang's *Myth, Ritual and Religion*; (1897-98) Robertson Smith's epoch-making *Lectures on the Religion of the Semites*; (1903) J. G. Frazer's *The Golden Bough*, 2d edition, signalized as "a scientific rehabilitation of magic"; with the attitude of scholars from the time of Tylor to the present toward animism (1910); and with the development of the method employed in the science.

In passing it may be interesting to observe that the fact that the contributions of the Germans to the development of this science have been relatively slight is emphasized by the relatively few references to German works to be found in the contents of these volumes. In conclusion, by way of general appraisal one may safely say that these volumes of Goblet d'Alviella constitute a valuable possession for all those to whom the conclusions of the science of religion are of importance.

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THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF RELIGION

Professor Hocking¹ has made a serious endeavor to reinterpret idealism in a way which will afford a positive groundwork for religion. The author is conscious of a deep distrust of the services of recent thought for the purposes of religion. Pragmatism has exposed the weakness of classical idealism for religious needs, but pragmatism itself is not considered constructive in this field. The adoption of a theory of the universe, after the manner of classical idealism, does not furnish sufficient objectivity and authority. Idealism fails to work, not because it employs a wrong point of view, but because it is "unfinished." It "does not give sufficient credence to the authoritative Object, shows, so far, no adequate comprehension of the attitude of *worship*." It supplies too much a religion-in-general, a religion of idea, not adequately rooted in passion, fact, and institutional life. Thus far the idealist has not been able to expound the worth and use of church, dogma, creed, priest, mediator, the whole apparatus of God-worship which religious evolution has

¹ *The Meaning of God in Human Experience: a Philosophic Study of Religion.* By William Ernest Hocking, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Philosophy in Yale University. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1912. xxii+586 pages.

produced. These limitations the author thinks may be supplied to Idealism by Mysticism of a certain type. The entire volume may be conceived in terms of this task. The first part, in three chapters, deals with a statement of the nature of religion in pragmatic terms by means of its effects in history and in persons. Historically, religion is the mother of the arts, but the arts have obscured this relation by emphasizing their differences as they attained emancipation. "Art for art's sake," is their cry. "Where the arts thrive as separate interests, religion is feeble. The zealous religion of today is at home in the life of the peasantry, of the Bourgeoisie—wherever life is still simple and unified."

Part II discusses in nine chapters, "Religious Feeling and Religious Theory," and outlines the motives which have led to the retirement of reason in religion. The comparison of religions and the life-histories of religious movements show that "religion renews its life in great bursts of impulse which emanate not from new thoughts, but from rarely impressive personalities. . . . Their utterances are poetic, oracular, couched in figure and parable, not in theses. . . . As passion cools, theology spreads; and as theology spreads, passion cools still more." But Professor Hocking is not content to make religion a matter of feeling, apart from ideation. It is his conviction that "feeling does no work apart from its guiding idea," and that ideas are alive and vital only through such feelings as love and sympathy. "The meaning of the religious idea is so far inseparable from this fateful value-bearing as almost to justify the statement that religion is the region where fact and value coincide: where there is no idea apart from feeling, as there is no feeling apart from idea."

Part III is a series of free, somewhat impressionistic, meditations on "The Need of God." Different types of monism are reviewed with a view to determining what kind and degree of optimism is compatible with each, "for surely we will have no world in which it is not possible to be optimistic, and without danger to our moral fiber." Some kind of monism is necessary to give character to the world. Without this, optimism is impossible. But this unity may not lie on the surface. It may have to be achieved, and this would contribute that element of doubt which optimism also requires. But it is not sufficient to accept the scientific view of curing and removing all evils. There must also be an ignoring of evil. The optimism demanded must not be easygoing nor dependent upon a quickly discerned and readily won unity. "The One stands there, as our opportunity, not as mechanical necessity."

There is need also of an Absolute—a changeless framework within

which we may have the sense of real and progressive improvement. This is shown in the demand of the epistemologist: What can I surely know? It appears in the demand of the moralist: What ought I to do? No such particular inquiry yields the Absolute, but each one presupposes and implies the Absolute, "for *life* is but a certain consciousness of the Absolute."

But in addition to the need of unity and changelessness there is need for personality. Not only do we need a One and an Absolute but we need God. The crux of this problem is the presence of pain and evil in the world, and this must be dealt with in thorough fashion. "Men have no right to the satisfactions which their religion affords them, except as they earn that right by successful metaphysical thought." But for our author this task is not so arduous after all, for "Happily, metaphysical knowledge is the most universal kind of knowledge; the infant's first thoughts are metaphysical, that is to say, thoughts of Reality—though not by name and title." Basing the discussion here upon a criticism of McTaggart's *Dogmas of Religion*, the conclusion is reached that pain and evil are assuaged through companionship, especially through the sense of association with the Divine. I need this relation with an "Other whose relation to me is not subject to evil through its own defect."

Part IV attempts to show "How Men Know God." This is through Nature and social experience. "Nature is pre-eminently the world of socially verifiable things, the world of scientific research—which is general human collaboration on a common object. We look at Nature through the eyes of a social world." There is thus present to us everywhere Other Mind. All our social experience presupposes a fundamental relation with an Other. This social experience, it is asserted, could not exist if there were only empirical knowers in the world. "Our first and fundamental social experience is an experience of God." From this position it is not far to a restatement and adoption of the ontological argument. The reality of God is found in the necessity of the idea in all our limited and negative experience. The consciousness of defects and limits implies the consciousness of God. All other arguments conclude that because the world is, God is, but the ontological argument reasons that "*because the world is not, God is.*" But God thus found is not an object among objects, natural or psychical. "As an object in the world of objects, God is *next to nothing.*" The development of the knowledge of God (chap. xxiii) is traced from the spirit beliefs of primitive man to the conception of personality which includes

law. Religion becomes universal at the same time that it becomes most peculiarly personal."

In Part V is presented a treatment of "Worship and the Mystics." The importance of this part is seen in such statements as this: "Worship brings the experience of God to pass in self-consciousness with a searching valency not obligatory upon the pure thinker: in some way it enacts the presence of God, sets God into the will to work there." Mysticism is taken not so much in terms of its doctrine as its deed. It is rightly pointed out that religion throughout its history has been a matter of overt activity—of ceremonial, rite, dramatic enactment—more than a system of thought. The identification of worship with thinking is therefore a perversion and misrepresentation. This insight is undoubtedly valid and significant, but the selection of mysticism as the typical expression of this active attitude in worship raises many questions. In any case, however, the author presents an illuminating analysis and description of the mystical experience. Chaps. xxvi, xxvii, and xxviii present a suggestive psychological account of the mystic way, through negation of the world and the self, to the passive attitude through which God enters and energizes the soul. The mystic seeks the *whole*, rather than any particulars of reality. Through this totality, experienced in worship, the details of one's occupations and interests are set in a luminous perspective and given meaning and worth. But these two spheres of work and worship, detail and unity, must alternate and thus enrich and support each other. "Prayer and Its Answer" are discussed in connection with this mystical experience and partake of its essence. Prayer is mystic insight and "the answer to prayer is whatever of simplicity, of naturalness, of original appreciation, is brought into our view of things by this act of obedience of the mind to its absolute object."

Part VI is devoted to a discussion of "The Fruits of Religion," dealing with revelation, inspiration, and the prophetic consciousness. This discussion is controlled by the conception of mysticism just preceding.

Several important notes and essays are added. They deal with the Subconscious, the Relations between Idea and Value, the Knowledge of Independent Reality, and the Nature of the Mystic's Love of God.

The author's style is attractive and at times brilliant. He shows himself widely read, thoughtful, alert, and always dead in earnest. It is doubtful, however, whether he has always availed himself of the most serviceable materials for the interpretation of his views. One is

impressed by the prominence of rather abstract principles and arguments in the work of one who so evidently seeks to keep within experience and the concrete. In particular it would seem that the natural sciences and especially the social sciences have more to offer than has here been used. Perhaps a more thorough use of social psychology would have deeply modified the entire argument, as it seems about to do in the final, abbreviated chapter on "The Unifying of History," where it is said to be "the last fruit of religion to produce, or approximate, a prophetic consciousness, that is to say, a natural historic consciousness, wholly awakened, literal and real, capable of seeing the divinity of its own present fact and acting upon it. It is the work of faith to face the bulk and detailed circumstance of nature, banish its luck, remove its mountains." Such sentences as these do not seem to find so effective and convincing a setting in the phenomena of historical mysticism, as in the practical, humanitarian, yet thoroughly ideal tendencies of present-day religious activity.

The first three chapters of the seven lectures¹ recently delivered by Professor Royce on the Bross foundation deals with the religion of individual piety, social experience, and of reason. The fourth chapter deals with "The World and the Will," the fifth, with "The Religion of Loyalty," the sixth with "The Religious Mission of Sorrow," and the last with "The Unity of the Spirit and the Invisible Church."

Religion is throughout conceived as salvation. This notion of salvation includes the idea that there is some end or aim of human life more important than all others, and that man is in great danger of missing this highest aim. A sense of this need of salvation may come through individual failure, loss, or disappointment. Through all our caprices and because of them, we become aware of the value of the ideal of spiritual unity and harmony. But normally the experience of the individual leads to a social insight.

Social experience is regarded by Professor Royce as the second stage in the dialectic of salvation which in turn proves to be inadequate. This second stage is much in evidence at the present time. Religion is occupied with social problems and reforms. This social experience, however, is regarded as identical with its conventionalized forms, and therefore as necessarily partial and unsatisfying. Thus: "human society, as it now is, in this world of care, is a chaos of needs; and the whole social order groans and travails together in pain, until now, longing

¹ *The Sources of Religious Insight*. By Josiah Royce. New York: Scribner, 1912. xvi+297 pages.

for salvation. It can be saved, as the individual can be saved, only in case there is some way that leads upward, through all our turmoil and our social bickerings." It is then to the reason that the author looks to find the desired unity and harmony. The function of reason is that of taking our subjective, partial opinions and putting them in a larger perspective. Carried to its ultimate stage, this subsuming of particular, fragmentary experience under wider views brings us at last to the insight concerning the whole world of reality. "Opinions about reality in its wholeness, about the world, about the all, are appeals to the all-judging insight, to the all-seeing view, to the knowledge and experience that grasps the totality of facts, to the widest outlook, to the deepest insight, to the absolute rational decision. This ultimate Self to which the successive insights lead, is held to be more live, real, concrete, conscious, and genuine than any momentary experience.

But now "an opinion is a deed." To say "There is a God," involves a rule of action, and this in turn involves practical experience, taken as a harmonious whole. And this relation of the simplest deed to a consistent whole of action is the essence of the "Religion of Loyalty." The difference between religion and morality emerges at this point. Morality prescribes conduct in terms of duty, while religion displays a spontaneous, abiding devotion to a cause. The cause is no mere abstraction but is a live something. "My home," "my family," "my country," "my service," "mankind," "the church," "my art," "my science," "the cause of humanity," or, once more, "God's will"—such are the names for the cause. This quality of religious devotion was exhibited by Ida Lewis, the keeper of the Lime Rock lighthouse in Narragansett Bay. It is manifest in every devoted mother, soldier, martyr, lover, and scientist. This loyalty never regards itself as mere duty. It is the essence of religion.

Such loyalty gets tested in sorrow and evil, both in such as can be banished from the world and in that which must be patiently endured. It is in the noble endurance of sorrow, in the assurance of ones inner consistency and right will that the spiritual life gains one of its greatest victories.

It follows from this conception of religious insight that it may be fostered in a particular religious organization or it may express itself through other channels. In this view religion in its essence may appear in any sect or in none. Importance naturally attaches to the "Invisible Church" as that scattered company of loyal souls both in and out of all organizations, who follow the light they possess and remain faithful to whatever cause they champion.

Professor Leuba has just published the first¹ of three volumes which he has projected in the same subject. The other two are to deal with: (1) the impulses, motives, and aims of the religious life; (2) the means employed to reach the ends—ceremonial, prayer, communion, etc.; (3) the results secured; (4) the means and the results considered in the relation of cause and effect. The present volume, as the subtitle indicates, treats of the origin, function, and future of religion. Much of the material has already appeared in separate articles, but the volume becomes a real contribution by organizing the scattered discussions and by supplementing them with new chapters.

Professor Leuba is one of the pioneers in the scientific study of religion, and his investigations are marked by a rigorous and thorough application of the scientific method. It is of human interest, and I think it is of importance for the right understanding of the author's discussions, to have him frankly declare that he is moved to his task not only by scientific interests but also by an interest in the destiny of religion. In a note (p. 275) he avows an early religious training, the experience of conversion, and a continued sympathetic appreciation and understanding of religious life. In his treatment of the future of religion, after some attention to different types—Buddhism, Christian pantheism, psychotherapeutic cults—he commits himself to faith in a modified religion of humanity. Auguste Comte and the Ethical Culture Society contribute something to the conception.—“A religion in agreement with the accepted body of scientific knowledge, and centered about Humanity conceived as the manifestation of a Force tending to the creation of an ideal society, would occupy in the social life the place that a religion should normally hold.”

Of more immediate interest psychologically are other questions presented in this treatise. One is the relation of religion and magic. They are held to have separate origins. Leuba discovers three types of behavior in primitive society, mechanical, coercitive, and anthropopathic. Science, magic, and religion correspond to these, in this order. “Most of the forms of religious behavior arise from transferring practices useful in human intercourse to man's relations with gods. Because of the origin and nature of the gods, human relations are the prototypes of intercourse with gods.” This view encounters serious difficulties. It seems to ascribe discrimination and clearness of conceptions to savages, whereas Leuba himself repeatedly affirms that their conceptions

¹ *A Psychological Study of Religion: Its Origin, Function and Future.* By J. H. Leuba. New York: Macmillan, 1912. xiv+371 pages.

are "hazy and fluid." "What appears to him [the savage] impersonal at one moment may suddenly assume the characteristics of a spirit."

Another question concerns the effort of recent theology, particularly of the Ritschlian school, to ground the evidence for God in the subjective experience of faith and feeling. The attempt to regard this evidence as unique and possessing an inherent authority is effectively exposed. The claims for "judgments of value" as over against theoretical judgments are also criticized. "Before the theologians who claim to find in inner experience the data of theology, and on that ground to remove it from all contact with science, may be looked upon as intellectually worthy of consideration, they must explain how they secure objective and universal knowledge. The mystical claim can exist only because of the failure to separate the subjective significance of consciousness from the trans-subjective meaning which is attributed to some parts of it." Theology is challenged to deal with inner experience by scientific methods, and when it does that, it becomes a branch of psychology.

This is in keeping with the empirical idealism to which the author proclaims his allegiance—his emphasis being upon the word *empirical*. "The attributes of the ideal can be only those the value of which has been discovered in social intercourse." Consistently with this view, he holds that faith in God and belief in immortality are not the basis but the outcome of human worth and of social endeavor. In a cruder age this idea of God, thus generated, was accompanied by a transcendental belief in his existence. But for the modern man there does not arise belief in a personal God so much as belief in righteousness, justice, and a sublime purpose. Such beliefs "perform the essential function of those he has discarded."

Still Professor Leuba is unwilling to commit himself to a naturalistic philosophy. He is too good a psychologist to overlook "the idealism present in every human heart." What he does overlook, however, as it seems to me, is the essentially personal, social form of all our practical thinking. It is my conviction that the sophisticated, as well as the plain man, thinks his ideals of righteousness and justice in the God form, when he is dealing with them in dead earnest in practical life.

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